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CONTINUITY AND THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE 
DARRELL A. H. MILLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Declaration of Independence’s moral calculus is simple; indeed, it 
is “self-evident.” If law insufficiently protects freedom and equality, then 
revolution is justified. If L < (F + E), then R. This is the mathematics of 
heaven, of “Nature and Nature’s God.”1 
But as a matter of American legal practice, the Declaration’s moral 
calculus predicts little and proves nothing. It is a description of a political 
crisis, an expression for an act of creation; it is not an algorithm for 
governance. It is a formula, in the original sense: “a set form of words for 
use in a ceremony or ritual.”2 
This Article explores the use of the Declaration as a law-making 
ritual, an example of what Richard Primus calls a “continuity tender”: 
“[A]n inherited ritual formula that one repeats to affirm a connection to 
one’s predecessors,” but not necessarily “to endorse the content of that 
statement as one’s predecessors originally understood it.”3 This Article 
progresses in three parts: Part I explains why the Declaration is not law in a 
positive sense. Part II suggests that the Declaration is not law, but is rather 
a continuity tender. Building on the work of Primus, this Part introduces 
the concept of continuity tenders and explains their operation during 
periods of consensus and conflict. Part III explains how the Declaration 
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Oxford University; B.A. Anderson University. Thanks to my colleagues at the summer workshop series 
at Duke for their comments on previous versions of this Article. 
         1.     THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 2. Formula, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/formula (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
 3. Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 8), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471924##.  
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functions as a continuity tender in American legal culture. This Part 
concludes that the Declaration is frequently invoked as a way of breaking 
with deeply entrenched social and legal institutions in a way that makes the 
break appear, not a break at all, but the natural extension of the previous 
legal order. As example, this Part discusses the Declaration as a continuity 
tender with respect to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. It 
explains that while freedom and liberty—the F and E values of the 
Declaration’s moral calculus—can and have been incorporated (with 
various levels of success) into the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
those values are disciplined by the enforcement structures of those 
amendments. 
By contrast, the revolutionary aspect of the Declaration, the R value, 
cannot be expressed in anything resembling law. This Part explains why 
advocates who attempt to use the Second Amendment to make the 
revolutionary value as judicially enforceable as the freedom and equality 
values are mistaken. This Article concludes with an alternative explanation 
for the Declaration’s role in asserting rights to alter or abolish government. 
I.  THE DECLARATION AS LAW 
The Declaration is a majestic document. But it is not law. It does not 
purport to be law and it was not intended to be law. Courts do not enforce it 
as law. 
A dispassionate reading of the Declaration’s text shows that it does 
not frame a government, offer sufficiently concrete norms to guide 
behavior, or designate institutions to give form to its moral assertions.4 
Certainly the moral equation it articulates is not a legal prescription. The 
Declaration is a lawyers’ brief offered to an international court of political 
opinion.5 The entire first two paragraphs of the Declaration—eloquent and 
soaring—are prefatory.6 They are claims about why it is necessary to even 
make this argument. They have the ring of an opening statement. 
The bulk of the Declaration is a list of grievances: “facts” introduced 
to “prove” to “a candid world” why a confederation of slaveholders has a 
 
 4. See generally Lee Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the 
Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413 (2006) 
(examining the Declaration from an originalist perspective to conclude that the Declaration is not law).  
 5. MORTON KELLER, AMERICA’S THREE REGIMES: A NEW POLITICAL HISTORY 32 (2007) 
(observing that while the “preamble was an eloquent declaration of independence . . . . the bulk of the 
document was a lawyers’ brief.”). 
 6. Id. 
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moral right to resist its oppressors.7 Indeed, as Frederick Douglass 
remarked seventy years later, to the slave, the colonists’ explanation for 
violent revolution appears at best trite and at worst a “mockery.”8 Gabriel 
Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner needed no written declaration; 
the moral calculus of their rebellions was apparent.9 
Nor does the Declaration appear intended, either by its signers or 
those who agreed with its sentiments, to be treated as law.10 The 
Declaration of Independence, as indicated by its name, is an assertion of 
separation, but it is not an act of constituting a government.11 The “we” of 
the Declaration defines who we are not, unlike the “we” of the Constitution 
of the United States, who defines who we are. In fact, according to some 
historians, the Declaration seems to have been mostly forgotten, except as a 
memorial of independence, for at least a decade and a half after its 
adoption.12 
H.L.A. Hart described law as norms that officials, typically judges, 
recognize as law through a rule of recognition.13 The Declaration fails as 
law in these terms. Yes, the Declaration is included among “the Organic 
Laws of the United States of America” in the United States Code—along 
with the Articles of Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and the 
United States Constitution.14 But that ministerial act does not transform the 
 
 7. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Accord KELLER, supra note 5, at 32.  
 8. Frederick Douglass, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (July 5, 1752), in AGAINST 
SLAVERY, AN ABOLITIONIST READER (Mason Lowance ed., 2000). Samuel Johnson’s acid remark in 
Taxation No Tyranny bears repeating: “How is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the 
drivers of negroes?” 3 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON LL.D. 372 (1878) (emphasis 
omitted).  
 9. See A. Leon Higginbotham & Greer C. Bosworth, “Rather Than the Free”: Free Blacks in 
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 32 (1991) (“[I]f any people were 
ever justified in throwing off the yoke of their tyrants, the slaves are that people.” (quoting abolitionist 
David Walker) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). But see Clarence Thomas, Toward a 
“Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 30 HOW. L. J. 983, 994 (1987) (“The original Constitution’s guarantee clause [Art. IV, § 
4] read in light of the Declaration of Independence, points in the direction of abolition, though not 
through violent means.”).  
 10. Mark Tushnet, Politics, National Identity, and the Thin Constitution, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 
545, 563 (2000) (“[T]he Constitution's adopters did not think that the Preamble and, more broadly, the 
principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence were law in the conventional sense.”). 
 11. See Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (1989) (“The 
Constitution is not the direct descendant of the Declaration, but is at best only a collateral heir.”). 
 12. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
168–69 (1997). 
 13. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose 
Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 720–21 (2006). 
 14. These documents appear in the front matter of the United States Code (2012) beginning at 
page XLV. 
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Declaration into law, much less the supreme law of the land, as generations 
of pro se litigants have discovered.15 Most judges regard the Declaration as 
expressing some “general statements about inalienable rights or 
‘fundamental fairness’” but saying “little about the prerogatives of an 
individual in concrete factual situations.”16 Instead, the overwhelming 
consensus of judges is that the Declaration alone, in whole or in part, 
contains no enforceable norms.17 
II.  THE DECLARATION AS A CONTINUITY TENDER 
Despite the Declaration’s failure as law, it undeniably plays a 
significant role in American political and legal culture. When backwoods 
distillers took up arms against President George Washington in the 
Whiskey Rebellion, they marched to the natural-law strains of the 
Declaration.18 When the states that formed the Confederacy voted to secede 
from the Union, they asserted the Declaration as authority.19 When Lincoln 
 
 15. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Declaration of Independence . . . is not a legal prescription conferring power upon the courts.”); 
Schifanelli v. United States, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 21107, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1988) (per curiam) 
(“The Declaration of Independence is a statement of ideals, not law.”); Swepi, LP v. Mora Cty., 81 F. 
Supp. 3d 1075, 1173 (D.N.M. 2015) (“[C]orporations have constitutional rights that inferior law cannot 
infringe, regardless of the Defendants’ interpretation of the Declaration of Independence.”); Rondeau v. 
Rogers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78932, at *7–8 (D.N.H. July 8, 2010) (“The Declaration of 
Independence does not give rise to a private right of action to enforce the ‘unalienable rights’ it 
describes.”); Bowler v. Welsh, 719 F. Supp. 25, 26 (D. Me. 1989) (“We have no jurisdiction over 
claims allegedly arising under the Declaration of Independence.”). See also Carlton F.W. Larson, The 
Declaration of Independence: A 225th Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REV. 701, 710 
(2001) (“Pro se litigants turn to the Declaration with disturbing regularity, invoking it as a palliative for 
almost every conceivable injury.”) 
  Some state court opinions cite the Declaration’s listing in the United States Code as evidence 
of the Declaration’s source as a legally enforceable document, but to date, those opinions remain 
outliers. E.g. Patel v. Tex. Dept. of Licensing and Regulation, S.W.3d, 2015 WL 3982687, at *37 & 
n.200 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J., concurring) (“The might of the majority, whatever the vote count, cannot 
trample individuals’ rights recognized in both our federal and state Constitutions, not to mention in our 
nation’s first law, the Declaration.”). See also Ex Parte T.M., 160 So. 3d 10, 15 (Ala. 2014) (Moore, 
C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 16. Derden v. McNeil, 978 F.2d 1453, 1456 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992) (Jones, J.). 
 17. See, e.g., Coffey v. United States, 939 F. Supp. 185, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (the Declaration 
“does not grant rights that may be pursued through the judicial system”). The sentiment is as old as the 
nation, as illustrated by Calder v. Bull: “If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the 
Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their 
constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, 
contrary to the principles of natural justice.” 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring).  
 18. THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION 37, 178 (1986).  
 19. See, for example, the secession statement of South Carolina:  
          “We, therefore, the People of South Carolina, by our delegates in Convention assembled, 
appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared 
that the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America, is 
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and the Radical Republicans pushed Congress to pass the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, they invoked the truth that 
“all men are created equal.”20 Martin Luther King, Jr. trumpeted the 
Declaration in the March on Washington;21 Tea Party leaders plastered it in 
blog postings two generations later.22 
How is it that people as different in time and temperament as mid-
twentieth-century civil rights marchers and nineteenth-century Southern 
revanchists seek authority in its few paragraphs? Why are judges of all 
ideological stripes compelled to cite it, when almost none would strike 
down a single law based solely upon its text? A facile answer is that the 
Declaration makes good rhetoric. The document can be summarized in a 
handful of aphorisms, or tweets. Overlay the prestige of the Founding 
Fathers and naturally the Declaration will find its way into everything from 
judicial opinions to Fourth of July sales. 
But the rhetorical power of the Declaration is easily overstated. It’s 
good, but it’s not flawless. It’s not as impassioned as Patrick Henry’s “Give 
Me Liberty or Give Me Death” speech. It’s neither as concrete nor as 
sophisticated as Common Sense or The Federalist. It doesn’t have the 
moral clarity of the Sermon on the Mount or the Ten Commandments. It 
can’t even claim originality; its most memorable passages are paraphrases 
of John Locke’s Second Treatise.23 And then, there’s the stench of 
 
dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, 
as a separate and independent State; with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, 
establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.” 
Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from 
the Federal Union (Dec. 24, 1860), AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_ 
scarsec.asp. Jefferson Davis, upon assuming the presidency of the Confederacy, declared:  
          “[W]hen, in the judgment of the sovereign States composing this Confederacy, it has been 
perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was 
established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot box declared that, so far as they are concerned, the 
Government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the right which 
the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, defined to be ‘inalienable.’” Confederate States of 
America–Inaugural Address of the President of the Provisional Government (Feb. 18, 1861), AVALON 
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csainau.asp. 
 20. HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 278 (1982); 
MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 108 (2001). 
       21.     Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the March on Washington (Aug. 28, 
1963), http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf. 
 22. Alex Pappas, Tea Party Activists Circulate ‘Declaration of Independence’ and Distance 
Selves from Republicans, DAILY CALLER (Feb. 24, 2010, 3:14 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2010/02/24/tea-party-activists-circulate-declaration-of-independence-and-
distance-selves-from-republicans. 
 23. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 72 (1997) 
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hypocrisy that clings to it, given that its principal author was a life-long 
slave holder. Rhetoric alone does not explain why the Declaration—unique 
among America’s founding documents—generates such a long legal 
penumbra. 
An alternative explanation is that the Declaration offers what 
Lawrence Solum has called “linguistic facts” or “contextual enrichment” 
for unclear constitutional language.24 What does the “judicial power” mean 
in Article III? Consult the Declaration.25 What does “Legislature” mean in 
the Elections Clause? Consult the Declaration.26 But this explanation, too, 
seems incomplete for much the same reason as the rhetorical explanation. 
If linguistic facts or contextual enrichment are mostly an exercise in 
linguistic anthropology, why does the Declaration supply any better 
evidence of meaning than the private letters of Abigail Adams,27 a contract 
for horseshoes,28 or the poems of Phillis Wheatley?29 
One may argue that the Declaration is not just evidence of linguistic 
practice, but an expression of the American “ethos,” “the shared values of 
the American people.”30 That is almost certainly true, but it suffers from 
some serious question-begging. What makes the Declaration such an 
important, even primary expression of the American ethos? Age? 
Aspiration? Authority? How do we know it expresses the American ethos? 
Is that a political or sociological conclusion? One can imagine nontrivial 
arguments that Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms or the Social Security Act are 
equally or more expressive of the American ethos than the Declaration.31 
These questions about the place of the Declaration in America’s 
 
(“The Declaration of Independence reads like a paraphrase of Locke’s influential Second Treatise of 
Civil Government.”).  
 24. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 
1973–4. 
 25. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (citing the Declaration as why Article III 
judges are politically insulated).  
 26. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2015). 
       27.      Solum, supra note 24, at 1974 (noting that “nonpublic documents like diaries [and] private 
letters” can provide evidence of linguistic facts). 
 28. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory 
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 770–71 (2009). 
 29. See Solum, supra note 25, at 1974.  
 30. Id. Accord PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94–95 (1982) (describing ethos as those 
arguments that depend on claims about the character of the American people).  
 31. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 416 
(2007) (identifying Social Security, the Clean Water Act, and Medicare as texts that appear “to embody 
the basic aspirations and values of [our] society”). 
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“Unwritten Constitution”32 cannot be resolved in this short Article. Instead, 
I want to offer an additional, not an alternative, explanation for the unique 
role of the Declaration in American law. The Declaration has developed in 
American legal culture into a type of “continuity tender.” A continuity 
tender, according to Richard Primus, is “an inherited statement that 
members of a community repeat in order to affirm their connection to the 
community’s history, even though they may no longer hold the values or 
face the circumstances that made the statement sensible for their 
predecessors.”33 Henry, the Bible, or Roosevelt may be better rhetoric, 
more reliable evidence of usage, or a closer expression of the true 
American character, but only the Declaration has the ability to link a given 
norm to the American creation story. Invocations of the Declaration 
predicate certain types of law-making in the United States, just as 
invocations of the Queen’s authority predicate certain types of law-making 
in the United Kingdom. In both cases, the function of the invocation is to 
generate acceptance that the new norm is the natural and unbroken 
successor to the ancient legal order. 
Parliamentary lawmaking in Britain begins with a ritual. As Primus 
observes, all laws passed by Parliament in the United Kingdom begin with 
the phrase “Be it enacted by the Queen’s Most Excellent Majesty.”34 The 
rule of recognition among Britons is “what the Queen in Parliament enacts 
is law.”35 This phrase, which expresses the Queen’s consent, is how the 
Queen-in-Parliament separates law-making from other kinds of norm 
generation.36 But the phrase is a formula. As Primus notes, the “Queen” 
part of the Queen-in-Parliament must give her assent to any bill Parliament 
submits to her. Theoretically, she could refuse her assent37—but she never 
does. In fact, no monarch has done so since 1708.38 Practically no one, not 
the majority in Parliament, not the minority in Parliament, not even the 
 
 32. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012). 
 33. Primus, supra note 3, at 3.  
 34. Id. at 18. 
 35. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 108 (1961). See also Michael Steven Green, Legal 
Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal Order, 83 N.C. L. REV. 331, 355–56 (2005). 
I will assume for purposes of this Article Parliamentary sovereignty, putting aside the many 
complications. See NICHOLAS J. MCBRIDE & SANDY STEEL, GREAT DEBATES IN JURISPRUDENCE 46–47 
(2014).  
 36. Or King-in-Parliament, if the sovereign is male.  
 37. HART, supra note 35, at 108 (suggesting that the Queen’s inability to refuse assent is a 
“convention” but not a “legal duty” because “courts do not recognize [the convention of assent] as 
imposing a legal duty” upon the Queen).  
 38. Primus, supra note 3, at 9 n.32.  
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Queen herself, thinks she can veto legislation by withholding her assent.39 
Parliament can only make law with the Queen’s permission and the Queen 
cannot withhold her permission from Parliament.40 The theater of Queen-
in-Parliament “enacting” is what makes law, law.41 
Further, laws of Queen Elizabeth I in Parliament, unless abrogated, are 
as much law as those made by Queen Elizabeth II in Parliament.42 The 
continuity tender helps bridge the centuries. When the Queen-in-Parliament 
says “Be it enacted,” it triggers a rule of recognition that is “connect[ed] to 
generations of British subjects” who lived both before and after Magna 
Carta, the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, and the extinction of 
the royal veto.43 Through this performance, the Queen-in-Parliament 
“locates itself as part of their tradition,” creating continuity between those 
British who never thought the Queen could refuse her assent, and those that 
did.44 
In times of consensus, continuity tenders are comforting rituals that 
bind a legal order to its people and to its history.45 Stated at a sufficiently 
high level of abstraction—say a right to “life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness” or a right “to alter or to abolish” government—the performance 
is relatively cost-free.46 The tender is so cheap, in fact, that some may be 
emboldened to say that the right is inalienable. In these circumstances, the 
ritual truly is theater: it “signal[s] loyalty to the constitutional tradition,” 
but it has minimal impact on governance.47 
Consider that few Americans who lived from 1776 to the early 
nineteenth century thought that enslaved Africans were “created equal,” or 
 
 39. Primus cites the pithy quote that “the Queen ‘must sign her own death-warrant if the two 
Houses send it up to her.’” Id. at 9 (quoting WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 96 
(1867)). 
 40. That is, unless Parliament asks her to withhold her assent, which was the source of a recent 
constitutional “kerfuffle.” Id. at 28.  
 41. Id. at 10 (“Parliament enacts (that is, performs) its continuity with all of those chapters in 
British history.”). 
 42. See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817, 840 (2015) (“We regularly treat unrepealed statutes as law, for example, whether they were 
passed a century ago or in the last legislative session.”). See also HART, supra note 35, at 63 (“For 
Victorian statutes and those passed by the Queen in Parliament today surely have precisely the same 
legal status in present-day England.”).  
 43. Primus, supra note 3, at 9.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 27. 
 46. Id. at 12.  
 47. Id. at 13. 
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that they possessed “unalienable rights” to life and liberty.48 Those that did, 
or were unsure, certainly did not supply much legal force to that sentiment. 
The Declaration and the Revolution fought under its banner “had no 
immediate impact on the struggle to deny slavery its legitimacy as an 
institution.”49 Northerners and Southerners could celebrate the Declaration 
on the Fourth of July and reaffirm their commitment to the American 
Republic50 without the ceremony materially affecting the central legal and 
political issue of the time.51 Anyone who stood up and demanded 
immediate nationwide abolition on the authority of the Declaration was 
considered a lunatic, a radical, or a person wholly ignorant of American 
legal practice.52 
In times of conflict, however, continuity tenders can become 
“weaponized.”53 One group insists the formula imposes material 
obligations on the legal order. Someone demands immediate emancipation 
of all enslaved Africans based on the Declaration alone;54 another rallies 
troops to resist Congress because of a right to alter or abolish 
government.55 “[T]he weapon is potent,” according to Primus, “because it 
 
        48. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 
1760–1848, at 264 (1977) (“Before 1840, Americans viewed the Declaration as being rhetorical or 
hortatory, rather than as a substantive and operative component of the constitution.”). 
 49. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 372 (1978). 
 50. See Thomas Jefferson’s letter declining an invitation to come to the District of Columbia to 
celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence: “For ourselves, let the annual return 
of this day forever refresh our recollections of these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them.” 
SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 87 (1995) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger 
Weightman (June 24, 1826), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 584, 585 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 
1975)); Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Development, 68 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1023 (1993) (noting that some slave masters gave slaves the Fourth of July 
off as a holiday).   
 51. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856) (“[I]t is too clear for dispute, that 
the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who 
framed and adopted this declaration”); State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 376 (N.J. 1845) (“[I]t has been often 
adjudged, both by the State and Federal courts, that slavery still exists; that the master's right of 
property in the slave has not been affected either by the declaration of independence, or the constitution 
of the United States.”). 
 52. Cf. Primus, supra note 3, at 10 (“[T]o stand up in Parliament and oppose a bill on the basis of 
the Queen’s views would be just as alien to the commitments of British politics as it would be to refuse 
the gesture of continuity that the enacting clause embodies.”).  
 53. Id at 27.  
 54. See Ronald R. Garet, “Proclaim Liberty,” 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 152–53 (2000) 
(discussing arguments of abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison); Alexander Tsesis, Principled 
Governance: The American Creed and Congressional Authority, 41 CONN. L. REV. 679, 705 (2009) 
(citing the arguments of other radical abolitionists). 
 55. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 18 (explaining how early citizens banded together to resist the 
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uses a proposition that everyone affirms.”56 Those who understood the 
ritual as a continuity tender must then decide whether to expose the ritual 
as empty rhetoric (thus undermining its continued effectiveness as a 
continuity tender), treat the formula as consequential to governance 
(surrendering to its use as a weapon), or find some way to fit the tender 
within the existing legal order. This is precisely what happened with the 
question of slavery and the Declaration. As the next part explains, the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments resolved the weaponized use of the 
Declaration by folding its aspirations into the Constitution. But, despite the 
impassioned arguments of some, the Second Amendment did not—and 
cannot—do the same. 
III.  DECLARATIONS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND WEAPONIZED 
CONTINUITY TENDERS 
Various movements in American history have used the formula of the 
Declaration as a weapon against the established legal order. Agrarian 
revolutionaries, abolitionists, Marxists, laissez faire capitalists, women’s 
suffragists, and gun rights advocates have all found ammunition in the 
natural law generalities of the Declaration. These groups cite the 
Declaration to argue that the contemporary legal order is unfaithful to 
constitutional tradition, and that some other legal order would be more 
faithful.57 In the same way that believers in a royal negative may cite “Be it 
enacted” as evidence that legal practice must conform to the ritual, those 
that believe in racial equality, libertarian economic policy, or private 
military power, each have a passage of the Declaration to support their 
vision of the Founding. Otherwise, they say, the Declaration—and by 
implication the nation—is founded upon a lie.58 
As mentioned previously, when continuity tenders are weaponized, 
the existing legal order has three options: it can reject the continuity tender 
as merely symbolic, effectively destroying its future use for continuity; it 
can submit to the use of the tender, conforming its behavior to those who 
understand the ritual as binding; or it can sublimate the tender into the 
existing legal order. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments opt for 
the third route: they take the poetry of the Declaration and turn it into 
 
federal government in the Whiskey Rebellion). 
 56. Primus, supra note 3, at 33. 
 57. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION; POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD (2011).  
 58. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 49, at 371. 
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prose.59 This translation is possible because the concept of “liberty” and 
“equality,” abstract though they are, are capable of being enforced as 
positive law. They can be measured; they can be administered; they can be 
controlled. Some advocates have argued that the “right to alter or to 
abolish” government, as expressed in the Declaration, stands in the same 
position, and that the primary expression for this value is the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.60 But, as I will argue in this Part, 
the revolutionary value of the Declaration cannot be transformed into 
positive law through the Second Amendment in this way. A right to alter or 
to abolish government through force of arms is an output, not an input. It is 
always, and ineluctably, the dependent variable. 
A.  THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
The Thirteenth Amendment does not echo the Declaration. It does not 
use terms like “equal” or “liberty.” Notwithstanding, the Declaration’s role 
in the drafting and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment is well-
documented. Congressman Godlove Orth stated that the Thirteenth 
Amendment was designed to fix into the Constitution the natural law 
principles of the Declaration.61 Senator Lyman Trumbull stated that the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and in particular its enforcement through the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, would assure “the liberty which was intended to be 
secured by the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the 
United States originally.”62 Senator Reverdy Johnson expressed hope that 
the Amendment would illustrate “the truth of the principles incorporated 
into the Declaration of Independence, that life and liberty are man’s 
inalienable right.”63 Charles Sumner asserted that the Amendment would 
bring “the Constitution into avowed harmony with the Declaration of 
Independence.”64 
 
 59. Cf. A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of 
Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3, 15 (2009) (“Thomas Jefferson turned Locke’s 
prose into poetry in penning the Declaration of Independence.”). 
 60. See generally Brent J. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REV. 
673 (2000) (exploring some of these arguments). 
 61. Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 
393, 409 n.126 (2012). 
 62. See Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 
MD. L. REV. 40, 44 n.24 (2011) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 63. Id. at 44 n.23 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1424 (1864) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 64. VORENBERG, supra note 20, at 108 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 
(1864) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
  
612 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:601 
The supporters’ serial appeals to the Declaration betray a profound 
anxiety to show continuity between their constitution and the Founders’ 
constitution. The Civil War was fought to end slavery but to end it within a 
constitutional order that strongly presupposed slavery’s existence.65 Any 
outside observer of American legal practice up to 1865 would have 
recognized that the ability to own another person as property was legal. 
Any outside observer would have understood that, as a matter of legal 
practice, no judge had the power to abolish slavery throughout the United 
States on the naked dictates of natural law, even if the judge thought those 
dictates were expressed in the Declaration.66 And that was because almost 
no one administering the antebellum legal order thought that the 
Declaration contained norms that were enforceable on behalf of the 
enslaved in defiance of the written Constitution. To radical abolitionists, 
like William Lloyd Garrison, the choice was simple: scrap the Constitution. 
However, for those who wanted to save the Constitution, but abolish 
slavery, the issue was not as simple as an emancipation amendment. 
Opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment understood federalism and 
private property rights to be so foundational that they were immune from 
amendment under Article V.67 Advocates of immediate universal abolition 
could not simply assert the amendment lawful because it complied with 
Article V because the legal limits of amendment was the very nature of the 
dispute. As Michel Zukert put it: “[T]he debate posed the question of 
whether the [Thirteenth Amendment] was fundamentally consistent 
with . . . the Constitution . . . or whether it overturned the Constitution.”68 
 
 65. Slavery in the United States Constitution would be an example of “implicature,” that is a 
legal norm derived not from the text, but based upon assumptions that go beyond the text. John Mikhail, 
The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature and Implied Powers, 101 
VA. L. REV. 1063, 1078–79 (2015) (using the “Fugitive Slave Clause” (U.S. Const. Art. IV,  § 2, cl. 3) 
as one such example). 
 66. See David Thomas Konig, The Long Road to Dred Scott: Personhood and the Rule of Law in 
the Trial Court Records of St. Louis Slave Freedom Suits, 75 UMKC L. REV. 53, 61 (2006) (“No frontal 
judicial attack on slavery was to succeed unless explicit constitutional language—or something close 
enough to give validity to such a doctrine—was brought to bear against it.”). See also Suzanna Sherry, 
Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 183 n.64 (1992) (“It is well-established that neither 
the Supreme Court nor most state courts used principles of natural justice to abolish slavery.”). But cf. 
Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193, 209 (Mass. 1835) (“How . . . slavery was abolished in 
Massachusetts, whether by the adoption of the opinion in Sommersett's case, as a declaration and 
modification of the common law, or by the Declaration of Independence, or by the constitution of 1780, 
it is not now very easy to determine, and it is rather a matter of curiosity than of utility; it being agreed 
on all hands, that if not abolished before, it was so by the declaration of rights.”). 
       67. VORENBERG, supra note 20, at 109–11. 
 68. Michael P. Zukert, Completing the Constitution: The Thirteenth Amendment, 4 CONST. 
COMMENT. 259, 263 (1987).  
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By arguing that the Amendment is simply the positive expression of 
the Declaration, advocates of the Thirteenth Amendment were able to 
explain that their amendment was continuous with the original constitution 
without conceding the radical argument that the Declaration had superior 
status as law. The Declaration was a bridge between the 1787 Constitution 
and the 1865 Constitution, offered to show that the old order and the new 
one were continuous, despite the stark fact that so much was different. But, 
by securing Congress’s emancipatory goals of the Declaration in the 
Constitution, it simultaneously rendered those readings of the Declaration 
subordinate to the constitutional text. The question was no longer what do 
slavery and liberty mean in light of the Declaration, but what do slavery 
and liberty mean in light of the written Constitution. 
Drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment and its statutory precursor, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, also invoked the Declaration. As Representative 
Windom claimed with respect to the Civil Rights Act: 
This, I believe, is one of the first efforts made since the formation of the 
Government to give practical effect to the principles of the Declaration 
of Independence; one of the first attempts to grasp as a vital reality and 
embody in the forms of law the great truth that all men are created equal 
and endowed by the Creator with the inalienable rights of life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.69  
The appeals to the Declaration continued in debates over the 
Amendment itself. Bingham introduced the Amendment with language 
from the Declaration.70 Representative George Miller said that section one 
of the Amendment was “so clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of 
Independence of the 4th of July, 1776, that no member of this House can 
seriously object to it.”71 
As with the Thirteenth Amendment, congressional Republicans used 
the Declaration to establish continuity between the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Founders’ Constitution. The need for continuity was all the more 
important, given the coercion that the federal government brought to bear 
in getting the southern states to ratify that Amendment.72 Invoking the 
 
 69. Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of 
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 361, 384 (1993) (quoting CONG. GLOBE., 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (statement of Rep. Windom) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 70. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess, 1088–89. 
 71. Reinstein, supra note 69, at 387 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2510 (1866) 
(statement of Rep. Miller) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 72. See generally Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1643–47 (2013). 
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Declaration provided a way to show that, notwithstanding the unorthodox 
manner of its adoption and ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment was as 
much the law of the land as the Tenth Amendment or the original 1787 
Constitution. 
The Framers had sedulously avoided incorporating the Declaration for 
fear of stirring up the slavery issue.73 With slavery abolished by the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress had all the room it 
needed to fully incorporate the Declaration into the written Constitution of 
the United States. 
Except that it didn’t. The Fourteenth Amendment shares a textual 
similarity to the Declaration—so much so, in fact, that many Americans 
mistakenly think the phrase “all men are created equal” is in the 
Constitution.74 But neither “all men are created equal” nor “unalienable 
rights” to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” appear in the 
Constitution. Not in the Fourteenth Amendment nor anywhere else. 
Unsurprisingly, the lines concerning a right “to alter or to abolish” 
government—so recently used by the Confederacy75—aren’t in the 
Constitution either. The Declaration may express generally agreed upon 
values with which to implement ambiguous constitutional terms, but it is a 
mistake to think that the Fourteenth Amendment thereby makes the 
Declaration law.76 
The Declaration offers context to the Constitution, but it cannot 
contradict the Constitution.77 As a result, invocations to the Declaration 
tend to predicate certain types of law-making in American legal practice. 
When original meaning, history, doctrine, or practice seem to defy a 
specific reading of the Constitution, the tender is offered to show that the 
new reading of the text is consistent with the American tradition—even in 
the face of contrary precedent, longstanding practice, contradictory history, 
or when it is inconceivable that the drafters or the ratifiers of that text 
would have ever contemplated such a meaning. 
For example, the idea of “one person, one vote” in political primaries 
 
 73.  See GORDON LLOYD & MARGIE LLOYD, THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS 344 (1998) 
(observing that Madison was unable to have the principles of the Declaration incorporated into the 
preamble to the Constitution). See also Reinstein, supra note 69, at 385–87. 
 74. See Katie R. Eyer, The Declaration of Independence as Bellwether, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 427, 
428 (2016) (citing a press release from the National Constitution Center showing that 84 percent of 
Americans think that “all men are created equal” is in the constitution).  
 75. See Davis, supra note 19. 
 76. See generally Strang, supra note 4.  
 77. AMAR, supra note 32, at 247–48  (“Where the terse [constitutional] text is clear, it trumps.”). 
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was, according to Justice Douglas, premised on a “conception of political 
equality from the Declaration of Independence”78 even though dissenting 
Justice Harlan observed that such a notion “surely flies in the face of 
history.”79 President Johnson’s speech to the nation when he signed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 weaved references to the Declaration in nearly 
every paragraph. Johnson acknowledged that discrimination was “deeply 
imbedded in history and tradition and the nature of man.” Notwithstanding, 
the Founders had “pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred 
honor . . . to forge an ideal of freedom—not only for political 
independence, but for personal liberty.”80 Johnson’s rhetorical invocation 
was response to opponents of the Civil Rights Act, who raised non-trivial 
private property, takings, federalism, and Ninth Amendment objections.81 
In both the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Declaration supplies the continuity between a world that the Framers’ 
could not imagine (or could imagine, and feared), and the world the 
contemporary generation wants to create. Unlike questions asked of the 
Constitution, few seriously ask whether the drafters of the Declaration 
intended their words to have such an effect. Furthermore, the Declaration is 
cited as more than an expression of political morality concerning freedom 
or equality. Other forms of evidence are more reliable in that regard. The 
Declaration is offered as a continuity tender because it supplies a common 
platform upon which to build consensus around the new norm—a platform 
that other texts, or other forms of evidence, are less capable of providing. 
Without the tender of the Declaration, people are left wondering 
whether some kind of legal revolution has occurred. With it, people can say 
that the basic structure of the American legal order is the same, even if the 
legal products of that order are different. Precisely because of the formulaic 
quality, precisely because—if accepted—no one challenges the new rule on 
the basis that “the Declaration doesn’t mean that.” Precisely for these 
 
        78.     See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 79. See id. at 384 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 80. Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil 
Rights Bill (July 2, 1964), http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/selected-speeches/november-1963-
1964/07-02-1964.html.  
 [O]ur generation of Americans has been called on to continue the unending search for justice 
within our own borders. We believe that all men are created equal. Yet many are denied equal 
treatment. We believe that all men have certain unalienable rights. Yet many Americans do 
not enjoy those rights. We believe that all men are entitled to the blessings of liberty. Yet 
millions are being deprived of those blessings—not because of their own failures, but because 
of the color of their skin.  
Id. 
 81. See Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1095, 1127–29 (2005) (explaining examples of opposition).  
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reasons, the tender enables lawmakers to effectuate substantial, one may 
even say revolutionary change, without disturbing the basic understanding 
of what makes American law, law.82 
B.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
The Declaration’s power to link past to present is recognized and used 
by all types of social movements. I want to focus on one salient group. 
Gun-rights advocates and scholars have steadily built arguments that the 
Second Amendment derives its moral authority from the Declaration in a 
way similar to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some 
advocates appear to argue that a right “to alter or to abolish” government 
through the right to keep and bear arms is as much an enforceable legal 
norm as a right to equality or liberty.83 Even as others (who may otherwise 
be sympathetic to gun rights) express skepticism.84 
The Declarationist reading of the Second Amendment has some 
powerful allies. Prior to District of Columbia v. Heller, four judges of the 
Ninth Circuit stated that the “core value protected by the Second 
Amendment for ‘the people’ was ‘the Right of the people to alter or 
abolish’ tyrannical government.”85 Judge Alex Kozinski once referred to 
the right to keep and bear arms as a “doomsday provision.”86 The late 
Justice Scalia, in his more heady passages in Heller, seemed to revel in the 
idea of armed resistance to tyranny.87 It is no wonder that modern gun-
rights advocates frequently make these Declaration-based arguments in 
their briefs post-Heller.88 
While these arguments have deep political resonance, it is difficult to 
understand how they could be expressed as law. In the calculus of the 
 
 82. See Green, supra note 35, at 335 (“A legal revolution occurs when chains of legal 
justification are broken.”).  
 83. Cf. Brent J. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L. REV. 673 (2000). 
 84. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the 
Second Amendment: A Reply to Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 93 (2012) (“The 
Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to revolution, to armed resistance, or even the right to 
‘alter or abolish’ government if it becomes tyrannical.”). 
 85. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 576 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J.) (dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
 86. Id. at 570 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)  
 87. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) (“[W]hen able-bodied men of a 
nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.”). 
 88. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners Foundation, et al., in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees and Affirmance at 8–9, Woollard v. Gallagher, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013) (No. 12-1437) (making 
similar arguments). See also Amicus Curiae Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of 
Respondent at 9, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). 
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Declaration, equality, liberty, and law are subject to computation and 
adjustment. Equality can be measured. One can say the law makes a person 
a little more or a little less equal, and so the law needs to change.89 Liberty 
can be measured. One can say the law makes a person a little more or a 
little less free, and therefore the law needs to change.90 Even “happiness” is 
becoming capable of quantification.91 How does one measure a right “to 
alter or to abolish” government through violent revolution? 
One could say that a population must have arms sufficient to change 
government through violent means. But this leads to bizarre and seemingly 
injudicious (if not completely non-justiciable) questions, such as whether 
allowing private possession of armament x actually deters the United States 
military.92 
One could say that any law that tends towards government 
entrenchment, or makes it more difficult to challenge that entrenchment, 
undermines the right to alter or to abolish government. But a fundamental 
purpose of any constitution is “to entrench certain legal arrangements 
against change.”93 An ostensibly unamendable entitlement of two senators 
in Congress for each state tends to decrease the ability to alter or to abolish 
government.94 Supermajority requirements for amending the constitution 
frustrate the ability to alter or to abolish government.95 A standing army, 
the President’s role as Commander in Chief,96 the power to suppress 
insurrections,97 and the constitutionally specified crime of Treason,98 all 
impose substantial—perhaps insuperable—hurdles to alter or to abolish 
government.99 A right to alter or to abolish government—at least as 
contemplated by armed revolution—may simply be a “constitutional 
 
 89. Cf. World Bank, GINI INDEX (2015), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. 
 90. Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, 2015 FREEDOM IN THE WORLD, https://freedomhouse.org/ 
sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf; Heritage Foundation, 2015 Index of Economic 
Freedom, http://www.heritage.org/index/.  
 91. See MATTHEW ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 297–99 (2012); John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010). 
 92. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary 
Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643 (1995) (“To suggest that civilians equipped 
with Second Amendment-type weapons are any match for modern security forces invites murderous 
confrontations that armed civilians will inevitably lose.”). 
 93. See Young, supra note 31, at 426. 
 94. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. V.  
 96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.  
 98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 cl. 1.  
 99. See generally Dunlap, supra note 92. 
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ungovernable,”100 an area of political culture that is divorced from the legal 
content of a written constitution.101 
If there is no role for positive law in the right to alter or abolish 
government, where does that leave the Declaration as ritual and formula? If 
its invocation cannot predicate law making in the context of the Second 
Amendment, as it has done for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
what does the formula do? 
Perhaps the Declaration’s “alter or abolish” language serves the same 
role in America as other nations’ “right to resist” language: it is a pre-
commitment device that lowers the coordination barriers to any future 
action, or acts as an ex post ratification of the legitimacy of those who 
successfully stage a coup, or both.102 
As Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, and Mila Versteeg 
have recently documented, some regimes do, in fact, include a right to 
resist provision in their constitutions. But, the authors hasten to add, “the 
constitutional text cannot really be considered the source of the right per se. 
Rather, [a right to resist] is a declaratory provision” that may “stipulate[] 
predicate conditions and designat[e] who has the right to invoke it.”103 The 
right is stipulated as a pre-comment device. A ruler acknowledges the right 
as a way to demonstrate fealty to the rule of law, and the people have a 
norm, expressed in a text, which lowers coordination barriers to organizing 
a revolution.104 Equally, a right to alter or abolish government may serve as 
a post-hoc legitimization of a coup105—which, from the perspective of the 
British, the American Revolution undoubtedly was. 
Whether the Declaration acts as a pre-commitment device or a post-
hoc justification for our own revolution, its function is solely as a political 
matter, not subject to legal analysis. The tender offered to alter or abolish 
government in some senses is no longer a continuity tender, but a tender to 
discontinuity. It is submitted to the people, not as a predicate for law-
 
 100. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Property and the Unwritten Constitution, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1233, 
1234 n.6 (1993) (citing I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 86 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) 
(discussing the concern that no constitution, written or unwritten, can specify conditions for revolution). 
I leave it to legal theorists to decide whether it is in fact “ungovernable” because of the inability of law 
to justify its own legality, or for some other reason. See generally Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen 
and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54 ALA. L. REV. 365 (2003). 
 101. See Eisgruber, supra note 100, at 1234.  
 102. See Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the 
World’s Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184, 1208–16 (2013).  
 103. Id. at 1194.  
 104. Id. at 1208–12.  
 105. Id. at 1212–16.  
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making within the old constitutional system, but as a way to precipitate a 
true legal revolution—the end of one legal regime and the creation of 
another. 
